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CVE-2026-54885

Server-side request forgery in Boruta OAuth request_uri and OpenID jwks_uri fetching

Medium6.9Public exploitEPSS 0.47%
Published
Updated
Reserved
Assigned by
EEF

Description

Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability in malach-it Boruta allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause the OAuth/OpenID authorization server to issue outbound HTTP requests to attacker-chosen URIs, including internal services and cloud metadata endpoints. Three code paths fetch remote URIs supplied by the requester without sufficient validation of the target. Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base.fetch_unsigned_request/1 in lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex dereferences the OAuth request_uri parameter from the authorization request via Finch.build(:get, request_uri) |> Finch.request(OpenIDHttpClient). Boruta.Openid.parse_registration_params/2 in lib/boruta/openid.ex dereferences the jwks_uri supplied in an OpenID Connect dynamic client registration request. Boruta.Ecto.Clients.refresh_jwk_from_jwks_uri/1 in lib/boruta/adapters/ecto/clients.ex later refreshes the stored jwks_uri for an existing client. In all three paths the only validation is that the URI parses with a scheme (and one of the two request_uri clauses does not even restrict the scheme to http or https). The implementations do not require HTTPS, do not enforce a host or IP allowlist, do not reject loopback, private, link-local, or other non-public ranges after DNS resolution, do not cap response size, and do not constrain redirects. An attacker can therefore steer the server's HTTP client at arbitrary network targets reachable from the Boruta host. This issue affects boruta: from 2.3.2 before 2.3.7.

Public exploit

A reference of the record is tagged as an exploit or proof of concept: anyone can try it against an unpatched system. CISA's SSVC rates its exploitation: a proof of concept is public.

Timeline

  1. ID reserved

    By EEF

  2. · 44 days later

    Published

  3. · 1 day later

    Record updated

Changes after publication (a new score, a public exploit, EPSS crossing 1, 10 or 50 %, leaving KEV) are kept since November 2026; earlier ones are not known.

Scores

CVSS scores of CVE-2026-54885, by who scored it
Scored byCVSSScoreVector
EEFCNA (assigner)4.0Medium6.9CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
NVDNVD · Deferred4.0Medium6.9CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
EPSS (exploitation in 30 days)
0.47% · top 59% of all CVEs (7 Nov 2026)
CISA SSVC
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
Loading the EPSS history…

The list uses the assigner's score when there is one, then CISA's, then NVD's: Medium 6.9.

Weakness

Affected products

What to do

Workaround: Restrict the network egress of the Boruta host so that the OAuth/OpenID authorization server cannot reach loopback, private, link-local, multicast, or cloud metadata addresses. Where possible, disable application routes for OAuth request_uri dereferencing and OpenID Connect dynamic client registration, or restrict OpenID Connect dynamic client registration to trusted callers, until a patched release is deployed.

References (5)

Sources

The same CVE in the primary databases and aggregators, to check against.

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Record last updated .