MISP Unauthenticated Blind SSRF via XML Body Processing

Description

MISP's RequestHandlerComponent automatically decodes XML request bodies on all write requests. The underlying Xml::build() library contains a logic error in its readFile guard condition (readFile && http || https), where PHP operator precedence causes the https branch to bypass the readFile check entirely. As a result, a request body containing a bare HTTPS URL is treated as a locator and fetched by the server. Because the cspReport endpoint accepts XML content type and is unauthenticated by design, an unauthenticated remote attacker can send a POST request with a crafted XML body to cause the MISP server to issue an outbound HTTPS request to an arbitrary target reachable from the server. The attacker does not receive the response body, but can use the vulnerability to probe internal services, trigger actions on internal HTTPS endpoints, or perform timing-based reconnaissance of the server's network environment.  The vulnerability affects any MISP deployment where the cspReport endpoint is reachable and the server has network access to internal or external HTTPS services.

Scores

EPSS (exploitation in 30 days)

0.60% · top 51% of all CVEs (5 Nov 2026)

CISA SSVC

Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial

The list uses the assigner's score when there is one, then CISA's, then NVD's: Medium 6.9.

Weakness

• CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) (opens in a new tab)All about CWE-918 and its CVEs
• CWE-20 Improper Input Validation (opens in a new tab)All about CWE-20 and its CVEs

Affected products

• MISP · MISP

  • affected < 2.5.47

What to do

Solution: The fix introduces a custom XML input type handler in AppController::beforeFilter() that validates the request body contains an XML document marker (the < character) before passing it to the XML decoder. If the body does not contain <, it returns an empty array, preventing the Xml::build() locator/fetch code path from being reached regardless of the vendored library's internal guard logic. This ensures only actual XML documents are processed, eliminating the SSRF vector.

References (1)

• Security patch (opens in a new tab)patch

Sources

The same CVE in the primary databases and aggregators, to check against.

• CVE.org record (opens in a new tab)
• CVE List JSON (GitHub) (opens in a new tab)
• NVD (opens in a new tab)
• FIRST EPSS (opens in a new tab)
• OSV.dev (opens in a new tab)
• GitHub Advisories (opens in a new tab)
• CIRCL Vulnerability-Lookup (opens in a new tab)

Badge for a README or a ticket

[![CVE-2026-95679](https://trackcve.app/badge/CVE-2026-95679.svg)](https://trackcve.app/cve/CVE-2026-95679)

Record last updated 22 Sept 2026, 15:37 UTC.