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CVE-2026-96453

Org.keycloak/keycloak-admin-cli: keycloak-admin-cli: kcadm custom truststore accepts arbitrary self-signed certificates

High8.0EPSS 0.22%
Published
Updated
Reserved
Assigned by
redhat

Description

A flaw was found in the Keycloak Admin CLI kcadm tool, which is used by administrators to manage Keycloak servers from the command line. When a custom truststore is provided to verify the server identity, the tool incorrectly accepts any self-signed certificate as long as the hostname matches. This allows a network attacker to impersonate the Keycloak server, steal administrative credentials, and perform unauthorized management actions.

Scores

CVSS scores of CVE-2026-96453, by who scored it
Scored byCVSSScoreVector
redhatCNA (assigner)3.1High8.0CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
NVDNVD · Awaiting Analysis3.1High8.0CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
EPSS (exploitation in 30 days)
0.22% · top 87% of all CVEs (7 Nov 2026)
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The list uses the assigner's score when there is one, then CISA's, then NVD's: High 8.0.

Weakness

Affected products

What to do

Workaround: Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability. --- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-11-06) --- Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure. The highest-value action is to disable TrustSelfSignedStrategy in the Keycloak Admin CLI HTTP client configuration and enforce validation strictly against the configured custom truststore: upgrade to Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.4.17 / 26.6.8 (or the corresponding fixed Red Hat builds), which disable TrustSelfSignedStrategy in the HTTP client and enforce certificate verification against the provided truststore, closing all 2 injection vectors (Man-in-the-Middle network interception, DNS redirection). Until patched, this is a concern on Administrators executing kcadm with a custom truststore option, so Avoid executing kcadm with custom truststores across untrusted networks, and restrict network paths and DNS resolution between client hosts and Keycloak endpoints. As a compensating measure, Cryptographically verify DNS response authenticity using DNSSEC validation to prevent DNS redirection to unauthorized servers and Isolate administrative traffic between kcadm clients and Keycloak servers into dedicated VLANs or subnets to prevent network interception. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying certificate validation defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate. Highest-impact CME: CME-203 Network Segmentation (VLANs/Subnets) (medium)

References (6)

Sources

The same CVE in the primary databases and aggregators, to check against.

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Record last updated .